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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 




STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
  
 This is an action for a declaratory judgment that a 
standard comprehensive liability insurance policy covers a 
liability incurred under the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA"), 42 
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675.  Central to its resolution is a choice-of-
law issue governed by New Jersey's choice-of-law rules.  We must 
decide whether New Jersey or Pennsylvania law controls the 
interpretation of an exception to a pollution-exclusion clause 
when New Jersey has significant contacts with the insurance 
contract and the insured but Pennsylvania is the site of the 
hazardous waste site giving rise to the liability for which 
coverage is sought.  Based on the strong public policy that 
3 
underlies New Jersey's broad interpretation of the pollution-
exclusion exception, we conclude that the Supreme Court of New 
Jersey would hold the New Jersey law governs this dispute. 
Because the district court applied Pennsylvania law and granted 




 The insured, General Ceramics, Inc.,1 is a New Jersey 
company that manufactures high temperature beryllium oxide 
ceramics at its main manufacturing plant in Haskell, New Jersey. 
Until 1991, all of General Ceramics's corporate, manufacturing, 
marketing, and sales operations were located at the Haskell, New 
Jersey facility.  Between December 1977 and October 1978, 
approximately five shipments of contaminated waste from the 
Haskell facility were transported by private waste haulers to a 
resource recovery and processing facility in McAdoo, Pennsylvania 
("the McAdoo site"). 
 In 1981, General Ceramics received notice from the 
United States Department of Environmental Protection ("EPA") and 
the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources that these 
agencies were investigating contamination at the McAdoo site. 
This investigation led to a request that General Ceramics remove 
from the site approximately 115 drums allegedly containing toxic 
                                                           
1  General Ceramics was formerly known as National Beryllia 
Corporation and is so identified on the relevant insurance 
policies. 
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waste.  General Ceramics complied with that request.  In 1987, a 
proposed consent decree for clean-up, monitoring, and remediation 
of the McAdoo site was filed with the District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  The EPA then filed a civil 
action in that court, pursuant to CERCLA, against General 
Ceramics and others, seeking damages and injunctive relief, and 
incorporating the provisions of the consent decree.  Through 
September 1991, General Ceramics had expended approximately 
$132,000 in clean-up and remediation costs pursuant to the McAdoo 
site consent decree.  In October 1992, General Ceramics notified 
its insurers of the environmental claims pending against it. 
 Between December 1972 and December 1978, Home Indemnity 
Company (referred to in the caption as "Home Insurance Company" 
and in this opinion as "Home" or "the insurer") had issued seven 
liability polices to General Ceramics, each covering 
approximately a one year period.  Home is incorporated in New 
Hampshire and has its principal place of business in New York. 
The policies were obtained through a New York insurance broker. 
All of the policies listed Haskell, New Jersey as the insured's 
address; all policies were maintained and counter-signed there; 
and all premium notices were sent to and paid from that address. 
 The Home policies provided coverage for "bodily injury 
[or] property damage . . . caused by an occurrence."  (See, e.g., 
app. at 84.)  "Occurrence" was defined in the policies as "an 
accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to 
conditions, which results in bodily injury or property damage 
neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the 
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insured."  (See, e.g., app. at 78.)  The policies also contained 
the following standard exclusion clause applicable to bodily 
injury and property damage resulting from pollution: 
 
This insurance does not apply: 
 
 . . .  
 
(f) to bodily injury or property damage 
arising out of the discharge, dispersal, 
release or escape of smoke, vapors, soot, 
fames, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, 
liquids or gases, waste materials or other 
irritants, contaminants or pollutants into or 
upon land, the atmosphere or any water course 
or body of water; but this exclusion does not 
apply if such discharge, dispersal, release 
or escape is sudden and accidental. 
(See, e.g., app. at 84 (emphasis added).) 
 After giving Home notice of the EPA claims against it, 
General Ceramics filed an action in the Superior Court of New 
Jersey against Home and a number of other insurers seeking a 
declaration that any liability in connection with the McAdoo site 
environmental claims was covered by General Ceramics's insurance 
policies.  After removal to the United States District Court for 
the District of New Jersey, summary judgment was granted in favor 
of Home, and General Ceramics's cross-motion for summary judgment 
was denied. The district court determined that Pennsylvania law 
applied, that the discharge of the pollution in this case had 
been gradual and not abrupt, and that under Pennsylvania law the 
gradual discharge of pollutants was not covered under the "sudden 
and accidental" exception to the pollution-exclusion clause. 
Accordingly, the damage at the McAdoo site resulting from General 
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Ceramics's delivery of waste over a one year period was not 
covered.  General Ceramics promptly filed a notice of appeal.   
 Both before and shortly after the district court 
granted summary judgment to Home, the other defendant insurance 
companies were voluntarily dismissed from the action with 
prejudice.   
 The district court had jurisdiction over this diversity 
action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  We have jurisdiction over 
the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Although at the time 
General Ceramics filed its notice of appeal on June 21, 1994, 
claims remained pending against other defendant insurers, General 
Ceramics's premature notice of appeal ripened when the remaining 
defendants were dismissed from the action on July 25 and July 26, 
1994.  Because this court had not yet taken any action on the 
appeal at that time, we may assert appellate jurisdiction over 
the prematurely filed appeal.  See New Castle County v. Hartford 
Accident & Indem. Co., 933 F.2d 1162, 1178 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing 
Cape May Greene, Inc. v. Warren, 698 F.2d 179 (3d Cir. 1983)).   
 General Ceramics raises three issues on appeal:  (1) 
whether the district court erred when it determined under New 
Jersey's choice-of-law rules that Pennsylvania law applies to the 
interpretation of the insurance contract provisions, (2) whether 
under Pennsylvania law the pollution-exclusion clause bars 
recovery, and (3) whether there existed substantial issues of 
material fact precluding summary judgment.  Because we conclude 
that application of New Jersey's choice-of-law rules require 
application of New Jersey law, we do not reach the second issue. 
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Because the district court granted summary judgment on the basis 
of Pennsylvania substantive law and because genuine issues of 
material fact preclude summary judgment under New Jersey law at 
this juncture, we will reverse and remand for application of New 
Jersey law in further proceedings. 
 In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we apply the 
same test that the district court should have used initially. 
Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Powell 
Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 76 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. 
denied, 498 U.S. 1109 (1991).   Summary judgment is appropriate 
where "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . 
. the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.  The allegations of the party opposing the 
motion are taken as true and inferences are drawn in a light most 
favorable to the non-movant.  Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534 
F.2d 566, 573 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977). 
In responding to a motion for summary judgment, however, the 
nonmoving party must "go beyond the pleadings and by her own 
affidavits, or by the 'depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file,' designate 'specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial.'"  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 
477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).  The 
district court's application of New Jersey's choice-of-law rules 
involves the application of legal principles and therefore is 




 A choice-of-law issue arises in this case because 
Pennsylvania and New Jersey law differ regarding the 
interpretation to be given the "sudden and accidental" discharge 
exception found in the pollution-exclusion clause of standard 
comprehensive liability policies like those issued by Home to 
General Ceramics.2  Pennsylvania's intermediate appellate courts 
have consistently held that the "sudden and accidental" exception 
does not extend coverage for gradual discharges of pollution. 
See, e.g., O'Brien Energy Sys., Inc. v. American Employers Ins. 
Co., 629 A.2d 957, 962 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993), appeal denied, 642 
A.2d 487 (Pa. 1994); Lower Pe Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534 
F.2d 566, 573 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 
(1977).__ 
  
                                                           
2  The parties do not contend that the law of Home's state of 
incorporation, New Hampshire, or its principal place of business, 
New York, should apply.  We accordingly do not consider the law 
of those states. 
